I relate Agent Smith's remarks on the abortive first attempt to create a Matrix to the problem of accounting for the coherenece of the Christian notion of Heaven.  I argue somewhat mischieviously that the notion of Heaven requires that it be a Matrix in which there is no interaction with other human persons.

"Much Ado About Nothing: critical realism examined," Philosophical Studies 115: 123-147, 2003.

Critical realism is the view that fictional characters are contingent, actual, abstract individuals, ontologically on a par with such things as plots and rhyme schemes, and quantified over in statements such as ``A character in Hamlet is a prince.'' A strong contender for the correct account of fictional characters, critical realism nevertheless has difficulty satisfying all that we intuitively require of such an account.
 

More mischief!  One of Baudrillard's books appears in The Matrix.  What are we to make of this?  I argue that if we take Baudrillard's post-modernist writings literally, then the Matrix is not a "simulation."  Indeed, the best extant instance of Baudrillard's notion of a simulation is Baudrillard-style post-modernism.  Moreover, if we take standard post-modernist claims about interpretation literally, then a modernist interpretation of The Matrix is at least as good as any other.   I go on to interpret The Matrix as rejecting Baudrillard-style post-modernism.

"A Modest Proposal," Public Affairs Quarterly 18: 1-12, 2004.

I argue that on proper examination, Peter Singer's overall ethical views do not imply moral vegetarianism, even granting his  controversial views about adult non-human animals.  By Singer's own lights, we seem permitted to turn our gastronomic attention to the very young, a result that crosses species boundaries.
 

David Lewis's approach to analysing truth in fiction, significantly amended by 'Postscripts' in 1983, has been widely criticized on three main grounds, and it seems fair to say that nearly every writer on the subject thinks that one of these grounds is sufficient to show that Lewis is mistaken. I argue that with some minor revision, Lewis's approach survives all extant objections. Indeed, I judge the Lewis approach to be even more successful than Lewis himself seems to think.
 

There have been many objections to the possibility of time travel.  But all the truly interesting ones concern the possibility of reverse causation.  What is objectionable about reverse causation?  I diagnose that the truly interesting objections are to a further possibility:  that of causal loops.  I raise doubts about whether there must be causal loops if reverse causation obtains; but devote the majority of the paper to describing, and dispelling concerns about, various kinds of causal loop.  In short, I argue that they are neither logically nor physically impossible.  The only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them.  Just how coincidental a loop will be varies:  some are really quite ordinary, and some are incredibly unlikely.  I end by speculating that the tendency amongst physicists to avoid discussion of causal loops involving intentional action may have been unfortunate, since intentional action is an excellent way to non-mysteriously bring about what otherwise would have been an unlikely coincidence.  Hence causal loops may be more likely in a world with beings like us, than in one without.